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“intensive testing,” which is ideal for case studies, but it has a
very different purpose and logic of inference. The goal of in-
tensive testing is to judge which of several competing hy-
potheses does the best job of explaining a single case. It is
therefore what Gerring discusses in the epilogue as “single-
outcome studies,” and here and there as “internal validation,”
but it doesn’t get the emphasis it deserves, because it consti-
tutes at least half of the justification for doing case studies.
Unlike extensive testing, which tests the same propositions in
a large number of cases, intensive testing tests a large number
of propositions in a single case. The logic is, “if my theory is
true, then I would expect to observe these 20 things in this
case. If the alternative theory is true, then I would expect to
observe these 20 different things. Using Bayesian logic, if the
20 predictions of my theory are confirmed and the 20 alterna-
tive predictions are not, there is only a very low probability
that my theory is wrong, and it becomes the better explanation
for this case.” It is usually impossible to quantify these prob-
abilities, but the logic behind them is very strong, and it makes
case studies a very powerful method for explaining single out-
comes.
This different emphasis would alter a few of the book’s
passages. For example, I endorse Gerring’s conclusion on p.
147 that “Case studies…rest upon an assumed synecdoche:
the case should stand for the population. If this is not true, or
if there is reason to doubt this assumption, then the utility of
the case study is brought severely into question.” I think there
are always reasons to doubt this assumption, so it is never
safe to generalize from one or a few cases. That’s why we
should use them for theory development and intensive testing
rather than for any attempt at extensive testing.
Another example: In his interesting discussion of match-
ing as a promising alternative to specifying control variables
in a regression, Gerring states that simply asserting that two
cases are more or less the same for the purpose of matching
“can be a huge advantage over large-N cross-case methods,
where each case must be assigned a specific score on all rel-
evant control variables—often a highly questionable proce-
dure, and one that must impose strong assumptions about the
shape of the underlying causal relationship.” (133–34). Yet it is
always possible to specify at least a subjective dummy vari-
able as a control, which would be exactly as accurate as assert-
ing that two cases match, and it is often possible to assign
more precise scores for regression variables. If assumptions
about the linearity of a relationship are false, they can be modi-
fied and tested. I come away convinced that matching, which
Gerring explains very clearly, is a method worth trying, but I
suspect, as I think he does, that it will not be as useful in
practice as it sounds in principle.
A final example concerns scope conditions. I love Gerring’s
call in chapter 4 (76–85) for making scope conditions explicit
and non-arbitrary; this is essential. But its implications are
ambiguous unless we make it clear what the scope conditions
demarcate. If it is tested propositions, there is little room for
arbitrariness: the scope of tested propositions is exactly as
large as the sample or the case used in the test; we can’t gen-
eralize beyond it, unless it was a random sample of sufficient
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John Gerring’s motivation for his book, Case Study Re-
search, is the same as Harry Eckstein’s writing on the same
subject three decades ago: He points out that case studies are
much maligned—the methodological doormat if you will—de-
spite their recurrence in so many influential works in our field
and throughout the social sciences. To address this conun-
drum, Gerring hopes to “restore a sense of meaning, purpose
and integrity to the case study method” (66).
And I think he largely does just that. He gives scholars
the potential to do case studies in such a way that any social
scientist could clearly see the logic through which the analy-
sis could generate strong causal inferences.
It is a vital and lucid work that ought to appear on any
graduate research methods syllabus. As much as it is a book
about case studies, it is a treatise on research design and logi-
cal thinking that updates and integrates many classic and more
recent contributions.1 The book keeps its feet on the ground
by examining a rich array of examples of completed work in
political science, often with a healthy dose of pragmatism.
In my comments, I will highlight some of the novel in-
sights found within various chapters in the book, and also
raise some issues that I think warrant some additional atten-
tion, either by Gerring, today, or by him or other scholars in the
future.
Definitional Issues
First is the question of defining the case study. If the
quest is to dignify case studies, then it is necessary to know
size, in which case we can generalize to the population. But if
we are talking about how far a hunch might travel, then the
scope of the hypothesis is hypothetical. It is essential to specu-
late about what the scope conditions may be, but we won’t
really know until some extensive testing is done.
I also have one question that is unrelated to any of this. In
chapter 6 (with Rose McDermott), which makes a beautiful,
concise argument that an experimental logic undergirds all case
studies, the most rigorous category, “Dynamic Comparison,”
is defined as having both spatial and temporal variation. I won-
der whether cross-sectional time-series analysis meets this cri-
terion.
In conclusion, I think that in reality I agree with Gerring on
just about everything and he agrees with me. I have quoted
some passages in which he seems to have an opinion different
from mine, but they are balanced by other passages that sound
very close to what I have said on these issues. If we have
differences, I believe they are only differences of emphasis.
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what we are dignifying. There is a lot of ambiguity in the con-
ventional use of the term, and in Gerring-style, we are afforded
a careful, well-thought-out definitional discussion in chapter
2.
He writes that the case study is “the intensive study of a
single case where the purpose of that study is—at least in
part—to shed light on a larger class of cases (a population)…
at the point where the emphasis of a study shifts from the
individual case to a sample of cases, we shall say that a study
is cross-case” (20).
By definitional fiat, he declares that case studies should
be theoretically oriented, and not purely idiographic. Of course,
others, particularly in other disciplines, may use the label “case
study” for other purposes, but he makes clear that this is an
enterprise that is social scientific. If one cites this book when
doing a case study, this is a clear signal: the case study will be
used to explore, illuminate, probe, or test broader propositions
about specified causes and effects, even as it uses proper
names and particularities in the discussion and analysis.
What Can Case Studies Do? How Are They Used?
In Chapter 3, Gerring puts his best foot forward and high-
lights the opportunities and comparative advantages of this
method relative to other methods. In attempting a similar task,
Eckstein may have done more harm then good for the method
by over-selling the inferential possibilities with case studies.
Gerring both tempers and expands the use of case studies by
customizing the opportunities for case study work within the
research cycle, and according to the type of theory one is
dealing with, particularly whether the theory is of a more de-
terministic or probabilistic variety.
In many ways, Gerring’s book shares a vision of what
constitutes convincing evidence that is more similar to King,
Keohane, and Verba’s Designing Social Inquiry than many
other recent works by qualitative methodologists. While it is
true that Gerring has written extensively on the subject, he is
clearly not arguing that qualitative research or case studies
are in any way the “superior” empirical strategies. He is mea-
sured about what he promotes. As compared with Designing
Social Inquiry, however, one does not finish this book think-
ing, “well, really the best thing to do is to avoid case studies,
and to redesign a social inquiry such that it will produce many
observations leading to a dataset amenable to quantitative
analysis.” Gerring stresses that there are often key observa-
tions that shed disproportionate light on the connections
between causes and effects, and that these must frequently
be combined across different types of units in order to under-
stand political dynamics. However, these connections are not
made within the context of conventional datasets, which, by
contrast, require unit homogeneity.
In this sense, the book really champions the idea of a
larger division of labor—one that might be integrated within
studies, or across studies, which is a view that many give lip
service to but this book really defends in logical terms. A
handful of key interviews or historical records may reveal the
plausible links between cause and effect that complement
correlational research of different types of observations such
that we can be convinced about the validity of a particular
proposition. Brady and Collier refer to this as causal process
observations, and Gerring also identifies a complementarity
with dataset observations. In any case, this is a book that
could be called “Mixed-Method” research as much as it is
“Case Study Research.”
Issues of Case Selection
The largest chapter of the book is chapter 5: “Techniques
for Choosing Cases.” I think any researcher on the verge of
doing case study research ought to go through this list of nine
selection strategies and make sure they can self-consciously
recognize one or more of these types as characterizing their
own, and if not, that should indicate that the study could prob-
ably be re-framed in a more crisp manner.
However, I do have some questions to raise. First is the
notion of the “pathway” case, as a separate type of case study.
A pathway case, according to the author, is one in which the
causal effect of one factor can be isolated from other poten-
tially confounding factors. As a pragmatic concern, I don’t
understand how one can choose a particular case for its po-
tential to illuminate causal mechanisms prior to having done
the research. And how is this different from some of the other
strategies, such as the “crucial case” strategy or even the
“typical” case strategy, which are also used for hypothesis
testing given particular scores on independent and dependent
variables? I suppose the identification of this strategy as just
one of nine makes me wonder what we are doing in the other
hypothesis-testing case study strategies.
I really appreciate the attention to deliberate case selec-
tion, and I know Gerring realizes that many case studies are
done with less pre-study consideration than he recommends.
But I do think more needs to be said about the role of area
expertise and personal experience. Traditionally, a clear justifi-
cation for the choice of cases has been that some investiga-
tors develop internal databases of contextual knowledge and
measurement skills that increase the reliability and validity of
the study. If true, perhaps this strategy deserves its own place—
it is probably the most practiced strategy in any case, and it is
hard to imagine this changing.
Relatedly, there are the examples of what I might call the
“convenient” case study. This is akin to available non-prob-
ability sampling, but it is also the reality of being a social re-
searcher. Sometimes case studies find us, we don’t look for
them. We may be working or traveling somewhere or reading
something, and our interest is piqued, perhaps because what
we observe confirms or contradicts some prevailing theory.
One might respond, “well, then you did not use a case ‘selec-
tion’ strategy per se.” Perhaps, but I am going to guess that a
sizeable portion of  case studies are generated this way—they
are the product of life circumstances and interests, personal
and professional. Thus, it may be hyperbole to speak always
of case selection when we talk about case studies. What we
might be able to do is to engage in case justification and use
the strategies that Gerring identifies to describe what it is we
have a case of.
Also, I am not sure where we would put Michael Burawoy’s
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“extended case study” into this typology of case studies. In
various works, Burawoy has sought to use extended and deep
case studies to discover flaws in and then modify existing case
studies. While it is true that in some sense the goal is slightly
different from the stated one of Gerring’s book, which is to
make inferences about a larger population of cases, it does
share an orientation toward theoretical conclusions. But again,
for Burawoy, the selection of the particular case tends to be
based more on the prospects for depth of study. This approach
is intended to highlight when variables were simply conceptu-
alized poorly or relationships misunderstood. It strikes me that
by depriving this type of case a real label, it is devalued in
principle, while in practice, it provides potentially enormous
contributions to knowledge. But to my knowledge one could
select such a case without any prior knowledge of the case’s
place in the distribution of explanatory or outcome variables.
Notwithstanding, the chapter does an excellent job of
bringing together the diverse forms of case selection strate-
gies that have been used by scholars, including the logic of
inference associated with Mill’s methods, and integrating them
within a single, comprehensible framework.
Process Tracing
In chapter 7, Gerring argues that process tracing is usu-
ally a component of case study research; it usually relies
heavily on contextual evidence. He states, “the hallmark of
process tracing, in my view, is that multiple types of evidence
are employed for the verification of a single inference—bits
and pieces of evidence that embody different units of
analysis...individual observations are therefore non-compa-
rable” (173). I like this characterization. But I wonder—and I
am really putting this out here for discussion—should the
properties identified for process tracing be definitional for
what we mean by case studies in political science? Should we
reserve the term “case study” for those studies that employ
such heterogeneous evidence? Otherwise, one might call, for
example, every single lab experiment a case study.
The chapter on process tracing highlights clearly some
of the strong empirical findings using this approach. He makes
a nice recommendation—that we ought to be able to graphi-
cally diagram an argument in a series of steps, if even in the
somewhat frighteningly complex manner that Mahoney does
in the case of Skocpol’s States and Social Revolutions. I
agree that diagramming is a good heuristic technique and
probably ought to be used as a standard.
But the chapter on process tracing is short. A mere 13
pages, one-fifth the page-matter afforded the chapter on case
selection. I don’t want to overinterpret, but this brevity, I
think, reveals some of Gerring’s own apprehension with the
case study method as it is generally practiced or understood
in political science. Gerring writes, “process tracing evidence
is, almost by definition, difficult to verify, for it extends to
evidence that is nonexperimental and cannot be analyzed in a
sample-based format…” (184). He says that the mitigating
factors for process tracing are that it is (1) supplemental; and
(2) can be vetted by “experts.” He concludes, “despite its
apparently mysterious qualities, process tracing has an im-
portant role to play in case-based social science...it deserves
an honored place in the toolkit of social science” (185).
Well, I detect a touch of inner conflict in that last sen-
tence. And I think much more needs to be said about process
tracing. Doing case studies well is doing this kind of analyti-
cal detective work. It is hard. I don’t know if we can develop
general rules and strategies, but I think we can try, and the
George and Bennett volume on case studies offers some addi-
tional discussion of process tracing.
My own suggestion for advancing the technique of pro-
cess tracing is to identify more tailored sets of guidelines
according to theoretical content and the level of analysis un-
der investigation, whether it be the mobilization of collective
actors, the making of policy, or the development of institu-
tions. Political scientists would benefit a great deal by break-
ing down a set of criteria which they believe would establish
a reasonable baseline for convincing or at least acceptable
process-tracing evidence, including, say, temporal proximity
of links in a causal chain; the explicitness of actor intentions;
and/or the types of sources used. These benchmarks would
not be ironclad rules, but might provide some standard for
how we could evaluate the robustness of a qualitative result,
just as conventional statistical analysis has measures of sta-
tistical significance. Just as a 95 percent confidence interval is
arbitrary, so would these standards be, but without them, we
have no reference line for discussing the content of evidence,
except for completely useless metrics like number of months
spent in the field.
Single-Outcome Studies
Finally, there is a concluding chapter on what Gerring
calls, “Single-Outcome Studies.” A single-outcome study is
when a researcher seeks to explain a single outcome for a
single case. This is an incredibly important chapter—it takes
on the elephant in the room of much social science research:
that research agendas inevitably get driven by real-world,
often catastrophic, events, such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks. I
offer Gerring the acronym SOS for single-outcome study.
But I must admit, I leave this chapter a bit confused. Are
SOS’es case studies, or not? Oftentimes the language of the
chapter contrasts the SOS with the case study, but in describ-
ing the studies associated with nested analysis (e.g., Lieber-
man 2005) as types of single-outcome studies, well, that seems
to me to clearly meet the criteria for a general case study.
Indeed, the very terms used to describe those studies were
“model-building” and “model-testing,” suggesting a direct
engagement with the types of cross-case claims identified as
central to Gerring’s ideal of the case study method. More
generally, it is hard to imagine a political scientist studying a
“single outcome” without some view of a larger universe of
cases, so I require greater elaboration of what this type of
study actually is, and how it is distinct from others.
Descriptive Inference
Finally, I want to discuss, if briefly, the explicit omission
from the book, which is the task of descriptive inference. It is
important to recognize that in this book, most of the science or
6method of case study research comes from the strategies of
case selection.
At the outset of his book, Gerring highlights that he fo-
cuses on causal inference because treatment of the “descrip-
tive task of gathering evidence is well covered by other au-
thors” (9). Actually, I disagree. I think that political scientists
have very, very few good references on gathering appropriate
data, particularly for the type of enterprise Gerring describes.
The collection of observations that come from heterogeneous
sources and unit of actors remains fairly ad hoc, and the task
of summarizing accounts has received scanty treatment in
political science.
Imagine a hypothetical study of ethnic conflict: someone
is doing a case study in county X, and a survey reveals no
hostile negative attitudes, but five in-depth insider accounts
relate a mix of characterizations, and there is a riot in one
province in which various ethnic slurs were shouted. As far
as I know, the methodological literature tells us very little
about how to score this case. And yet, this is the ever-present
dilemma for the case study researcher working with multiple
sources of data.
I don’t blame Gerring for omitting this type of discussion
from the book because it is really a different kettle of fish, but
I did want to highlight my belief that the integrity of case
study research will rest on principles of descriptive inference
at least as much as on principles of causal inference. More
generally, I think that the discipline has devalued case studies
for the very reason that we have emphasized the value of
causal inference to a much greater extent than good measure-
ment and descriptive inference, even though we know you
can’t do the former without the latter.
Going Forward
To conclude, Case Study Research: Principles and Prac-
tices is at its very best in relating the possibilities for case
study work in logical juxtaposition to other types of inferen-
tial strategies. It is smart, and provides sturdy analytical scaf-
folding for the development of new case studies. I think it
should encourage us to do more case study work with our
heads held high. But we will still need to be explicit and self-
conscious about how those studies get done so that we can
have an even better handle on what it is about intensive study
of a case that convinces us of the strength of a general propo-
sition. Gerring has made a major contribution to social science
by helping to systematize this genre of research.
Note
1 Such as Campbell and Stanley (1966) on quasi-experimental re-
search design; Eckstein (1975) on case studies; Collier’s (1991) and
Sartori’s (1970) statements on the comparative method and the rela-
tionship to statistical methods; and much of the more recent qualita-
tive methods research carried out by other scholars such as Mahoney
(1999); George and Bennett (2004); Brady and Collier (2004); and
King, Keohane, and Verba (1994).
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Particularizing Case Studies: A Critical




A large methodological literature addresses the topic of
case studies. But much of this work focuses on issues pertain-
ing to data collection, including techniques of data retrieval
(e.g., ethnography, interviews), coding, and recording. By con-
trast, John Gerring’s stimulating new book, Case Study Re-
search: Principles and Practices, considers the logic of case
study research design. Gerring seeks to explicate the meaning,
purposes, and payoffs of the case study. Although the book
focuses on practices as well as principles, it is not so much a
“user’s guide” as a full-blown theory of the inner workings
and rationales of the case study method. That said, all schol-
ars who read the book will discover many new ideas for carry-
ing out better case study research in practice.
The book is delimited by the kind of case study research
on which it focuses. Within the broad field of case study
research, Gerring’s interest is very explicitly on work that seeks
to make causal inferences, not work whose primary goals fall
into the realm of descriptive inference. For example, the meth-
odological issues that arise for case studies that are mainly
interpretive or rooted in critical theory are not the focus of the
discussion.
